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There are a variety of governance mechanisms concerning the ownership and use of
patents. These include government licenses, compulsory licenses, march-in rights for
inventions created with federal funding, government use rights, enforcement restrictions,
subject-matter restrictions, and a host of private governance regimes. Each has been
discussed in various contexts by scholars and policymakers and some, in some degree,
have been employed in different cases at different times. But scholars have yet to explore
how each of these choices are subject to—or removed from—democratic control.
Assessing the range of democratic implications of these patent governance choices is
important in understanding the social and political implications of controversial or wide-
ranging technologies because their use has a significant potential to affect the polity. This
paper seeks to unpack these concerns for genome editing, such as CRISPR, specifically.
Patents covering genome editing make an interesting case because, to date, it appears
that the polity is concerned less with certain kinds of access, and more with distribution
and limits on the technology’s particular uses, such as human enhancement and certain
agricultural and environmental applications. Here, we explore what it means for patents to
be democratic or non-democratically governed and, in so doing, identify that patents
covering many of the most controversial applications—that is, ones most likely to gain
public attention—are effectively controlled by either non- or anti-democratic institutions,
namely, private restrictions on licensing. This may be effective—for now—but lawmakers
should be wary that such restrictions could rapidly reverse themselves. Meanwhile, other
choices, like compulsory licenses, more broadly touch on democratic deliberation but, as
currently structured, are aimed poorly for particular applications. Insofar as the public
wants, or perhaps deserves, a say in the distribution and limits of these applications,
illuminating the ways in which these governance choices intersect—or fail to
intersect—with democratic institutions is critical. We offer some concluding thoughts
about the nature of patents and their relationship with democratic governance as
distributed claims to authority, and suggest areas for scholars and policymakers to
pay close attention to as the genome editing patent landscape develops.
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INTRODUCTION
Few technologies are recognized as revolutionary immediately
upon their invention. CRISPR—a form of altering DNA
sequences inside living cells, or “genome editing”—stands out
among those (Jinek et al., 2012; Gasiunas and Siksnys, 2013). Like
other revolutionary technologies, controlling genome editing
through typical channels of democracy has been a challenge
and a matter of public concern (NASEM Genome Editing
Report, 2017; WHO Genome Editing Report, 2021).
Patents—legal instruments giving their bearers a right to
exclude others from practicing a particular invention—have
been proposed as governance tool (Guerrini et al., 2017;
Parthasarathy, 2018), but the democratic implications of such
a governance mechanism has been largely unexplored. In this
paper, we examine patent licensing regimes—laws regarding the
limits of how patents can be licensed to others—as a governance
mechanism for CRISPR and assess these regimes’ democratic
implications. While many licensing regimes rely on forms of
representative democracy, they also seem amenable to broader
forms of participatory democracy, the latter of which may be
more effective than omnibus attempts to control a widely
distributed technology. Given this, a principal democratic path
to controlling genome editing lies in, of all things, patent licensing
regimes.
CRISPR is a form of genome editing, the ability to alter the
constituent DNA of a living cell (its “genome”), at will using an
engineered—and infinitely malleable—bacterial immune system
(Jinek et al., 2012; Gasiunas et al., 2012; Cong et al., 2013). It is
cheap, easy, and flexible; it has worked in every type of organism
yet experimented on (Gustaffson, 2020). But this ease at editing
the genome brings with it the potential for societally controversial
applications, such as “designer babies” (Greely, 2021). Many of
these are, frankly, little more fantasy, but the power of the
technology has instilled both awe and fear in the greater
public (Maxmen, 2015). Notably, CRISPR is subject to its own
body of dystopian literature (Ishiguro, 2021), impressive, given
that the technology is not even yet a decade old. And it is has been
heralded by one of its inventors as the “holy grail” of molecular
biology, a bold statement with few, if any, opponents (Gasiunas
and Siksnys, 2013).
As a powerful, commercially valuable technology, CRISPR is
subject to a broad patent estate. Foundational patents covering a
basic iteration of the technology are owned by the Broad Institute
in Cambridge, Massachusetts (a joint effort between MIT and
Harvard University) and the University of California, Berkeley,
among other collaborating academic institutions (Contreras and
Sherkow, 2017). Beyond these patents, there are yet more, held by
a variety of academic centers and research institutions around the
globe (Egelie et al., 2016). But CRISPR technology is rapidly
evolving, encompassing ever broader ways of effectuating
genome editing among other applications (Porto et al., 2020;
Marzec et al., 2020). The patent estate has similarly evolved (Bire
et al., 2021).
While certainly not ignored—and indeed, explicitly
mentioned by the WHO’s recent report on governing human
genome editing (WHO Genome Editing Report, 2021)—patents
have largely been overlooked as an instrument of governance of
genome editing. This is a somewhat surprising aspect of
technology studies scholarship because patents are—if not
else—a legal instrument designed to limit the use of a given
technology (Boldrin and Levine, 2005). Licenses are permissions
to use a patented technology on terms set by patent holder. This
means, accordingly, that patents control who can use a given
technology, on what terms, where, and when (Guerrini et al.,
2017). But not all licenses are mere arms-length agreements
among patent holders and interested parties. They are also
subject to licensing regimes at the mercy of government and
restrictions—beyond simple economic ones—from private
parties. On the government side of the ledger, these regimes
include government licensing provisions, march-in rights,
government-use rights, compulsory licenses, and licensing
restrictions. In each of these, and as detailed below, the
government either has an interest in the technology to practice
it on its own behalf or to compel the patent holder to allow
another to practice it in a way government deems fit. Beyond
these, private licenses—although there is no requirement to do
so—may set ethical conditions on the use of a given technology.
This is currently happening for genome editing with the Broad
Institute and others imposing ethical licensing restrictions on
genome editing, including prohibiting licensees from engaging in
some of its more controversial applications (Guerrini et al., 2017).
These licensing regimes—despite all ultimately being forms of
technology control—have differing intersections with democratic
theory. Some are receptive to the usual instruments of
representative democracy, such as the polity’s support for
research funding for certain applications and not others. Other
regimes are one step removed, those where legislative
representatives have petitioned patent holders to change their
licensing practices. At other end these examples lies private
licensing regimes, like those from the Broad Institute, that
seem, at first blush, entirely undemocractic. But they are likely
similarly receptive to faces of lay, participatory democracy, the
populous demanding measures from private actors wielding
significant amount of power.
Understanding all of this should be important to theorists and
policymakers alike. For theorists, it brings patent licensing as a
democratic mechanism of technology control, however
successful, to the fore. It also suggests that patent
licensing—long thought of as an elitist business—has more
nuanced democratic implications, especially for controversial
technologies like genome editing. This should similarly be
useful to policymakers and advocacy groups seeking legally
salient mechanisms to control technology in manners
responsive to broader constituencies. This paper examines
these features—patentsas technology governance, and patent
licensing as democratic instrument—in two parts.
Patents, Patent Licensing, and Technology
Governance
Patents as Legal Instruments
Patents are one form, among many, of intellectual property. They
are legal instruments that protect inventions from being copied
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by others without permission of the patent holder. In this way,
patents operate as a right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, or importing particular inventions (35 U.S.C. § 271(a))—
not, as is commonly misunderstood, an affirmative right to
use them.
This right to exclude is a limited right and only operates for a
limited time: all patents expire, currently 20 years from the date
when their underlying applications are filed. While international
treaties harmonize a variety of the world’s patents
laws—including this expiration period (TRIPS Agreement,
1994)—patents are domestic creatures only. US patents, for
example, are only enforceable in the United States; UK patents
only in the United Kingdom; and so on.
Moving from a patent application to a government-issued
patent is nontrivial. Around the world patents undergo a
substantive examination to assess whether the claimed
invention is worthy of protection. Inventions sought to be
patented must meet a variety of statutory requirements; in
particular, that the underlying invention is new, useful,
and—as the concept is articulated in US law—“nonobvious,”
i.e., a significant improvement over the prior state of the art (35
U.S.C. § 103). The patent document itself must also properly
disclose inventions to the world, broadly enabling those with skill
in the art to make and use and invention; describing the invention
fully and with particularity; and noting that the invention has
some nontrivial use (35 U.S.C. § 112(a)). In addition, patents
conclude with claims—single sentence recitations of the
underlying invention—that define the specific contours of the
patent right (35 U.S.C. § 112(b)). Claims, too, must be sufficiently
specific and intelligible to those with skill in the patent’s art.
Patents are also not self-enforcing; they must be policed by
their owners. This is typically accomplished through litigation,
i.e., suits for patent infringement. Generally speaking, an entity
infringes a patent where they use the claimed technology in some
manner without the permission of the patent holder (35 U.S.C. §
271). The remedy, if there is a finding of infringement, is often
either a measure of damages to compensate the patent holder
(typically, a royalty) or a court-ordered injunction, stopping the
infringer from the accused activity.
Despite these limitations, patents are powerful instruments.
Patent infringement, while not a crime, can bring with it serious
financial penalties. In the United States, damages for major patent
infringement disputes now routinely eclipse $1 billion USD (Kass,
2020). Further, patents’ right to exclude may mean that two sets
of overlapping patents will block others from practicing a larger
invention without an agreement among all relevant patent
holders—a case of “blocking patents.” Patents are, in effect,
legal instruments governing the use of a particular technology
(Smith, 2002).
Patent Licensing and Technology
Governance
Whatever role patents play in technology development—a hotly
contested area of scholarly debate—government policies
concerning patent licensing have the potential to ultimately
affect access, distribution, and conditions of use on particular
technologies. Patent licenses are permissions from patent holders
to use a given piece of technology. Like other property rights,
patent licenses are subject to a variety of government policies
regarding when, whether, and to what extent they can be used.
Those policies, the most significant of which are catalogued here,
further bring with them important choices about democracy and
polity—who, ultimately, has rights to access the technology and
under which conditions.1 For purposes of this paper, we focus less
on those decisions as effectuated through substantive patent
law—that is, laws concerning which inventions get patented in
the first instance, like the nonobviousness requirement—and turn
our attention instead to policies surrounding patent licensing and
their relationship to democratic or nondemocratic institutions of
power. While we focus primarily on United States licensing
practices, we note that many of the licensing policies described
here have close analogues around the globe—or, in other cases,
are harmonized by treaty. Licensing restrictions, potentially more
than substantive patent law, have potential to speed or hinder
technological development, to place it in the hands of a select few
or many, and to decide which applications can be broadly used
and under what conditions. Government policies on technology
licensing are, too, policies of technological governance and have
implications for democratic oversight.
GOVERNMENT LICENSES
Through extramural grants and other programs, governments
often fund a substantial amount of research and development
within their borders—globally, about $2 trillion USD per year
(Sargent, 2020). In the United States, the Bayh-Dole Act allows,
but does not require, recipients of certain types of government
funding to patent inventions created under their stead. In doing
so, however, funding recipients must agree to grant to the
United States, a “nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable,
paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf
of the United States any subject invention throughout the world”
(35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (4)). To be clear, this license applies only to the
United States government; the patent holder is free to license—or
refuse to license—the patented invention to others. But the Bayh-
Dole Act’s government license provisions mean, in essence, that
the government funding agency can use the patented invention
for free. Many countries have similar laws.
Taken broadly, this regime—that public funding grants the
government the right to freely use a patented invention—can be
construed as a mixed public-private governance mechanism for
the development and use of technologies. At the outset,
governments must choose which technologies to fund,
decisions that are ideally responsive to the desires of the
underlying polity. Cancer research, for example, receives a
1Although we focus on licensing in this paper, it is also the case that patentability
criteria—that is rules regarding which technologies can be patents—similarly
involve choices about democracy and polity. That, of course, is a complicated
mixture of a variety of branches of government, some of which have more
democratic features or procedures than others. For more on this point, see Part B.
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substantial amount of government funding because combatting
cancer is politically popular (Best, 2012). Picking and choosing
which technologies to further develop is then, often, left to groups
of independent experts charged with choosing the projects most
likely to be successful (Price, 2019). The ultimate technology
developed—if anything—is then a product of the funding
recipient’s own efforts (and, of course, chance). And it is the
funding recipient, not the government, that gets to choose
whether to patent any resulting inventions or place them in
the public domain. In this way, the Bayh-Dole Act its government
license provisions control how publicly funded technology is both
created and, to a certain degree, disseminated back to the
government if not the public writ large.
March-in Rights
Related to the Bayh-Dole Act’s government license provisions are
the Act’s rules regarding “march-in rights.”March-in rights allow
a government funding agency to “march in” and forcibly grant
others a patent license for a funded technology if the funding
recipient has not sufficiently commercialized the invention. As set
forth in the relevant statute, march-in can occur if the patented
invention has not “achieve[d] practical application” or is needed
to “alleviate health or safety needs,” among other cases (35 U.S.C.
§ 203(a)). Notably, while threats of exercising march-in rights
occur from to time, no U.S. agency has ever formally used the
provision (O’Brien, 2013; Thomas, 2016).
Like government licenses, march-in rights, too, can be viewed
as a mixed public-private governance mechanism for the
distribution of technologies. Again, the public chooses which
broader area of technology to fund, while private funding
recipients largely direct which implementation of that
technology gets developed and whether it will be patented.
The benefit of this bargain, in theory, is that the public will
have practical, commercial access to the technology, once
developed. But where the funding recipient or later patent
holder has not commercialized the underlying technology to
make it available to the public, government (and, presumably,
the polity) has authority to wrest it from private hands. In theory,
at least, such governance is a balance between private rights and
public benefits from the technology it, itself, has funded. And
indeed, recent march-in threats have been couched in just such
terms. A 2016 march-in petition directed to the National
Institutes of Health and signed by 51 members of Congress
requested the agency use its march-in authority “to respond to
the soaring cost of pharmaceuticals” by licensing patents
“developed with taxpayer funds, [that] are keeping those in
need from being able to access care” (Doggett, 2016). March-
in, is consequently, a governance mechanism over government
funded research “intended to distribute the fruits of those labors
to the public” (Thomas, 2016).
GOVERNMENT USE RIGHTS
Apart from licensing those inventions which it funds, the
government also possesses the right to use inventions owned
and patented by private entities. In the United States, one statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), allows the government to use or manufacture
a patented invention “without license of the owner thereof.”
Unlike government licenses or march-in rights, however, such
a use is not free: the government, after a trial, must pay the patent
owner a “reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.” (28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)). This provision, colloquially
referred to as § 1498, has, in fact, been used in the United States in
the past, most notably, in the late 1950s when the Military
Medical Supply Agency used the provision to cut costs on
tetracycline, a popular antibiotic, for personnel (Silverman and
Lee, 1974). More recently, government threats of using § 1498,
have encouraged recalcitrant patent holders to either cut costs in
supplying their wares to the government (as with ciproflaxin, the
antibiotic used following the 2001 anthrax scare) or enter into
other arrangements (as with sofosbuvir, the hepatitis C drug)
(Brennan et al., 2016).
Section 1498, consequently, can also be viewed as an
instrument of technology governance, a public restriction
on private ownership of patented technology. It essentially
removes the right of patent holders to forbid the government
from using the claimed technology, irrespective of the
technology’s development history or its genesis from the
coffers of government. The public—faced with outsized
expenses regarding a particular technology or some other
pressing need—can move patented technology from behind
private walls into the public sphere, so long as the government
pays the patent owner compensation for its use. This larger
conflict regarding access to privately owned technology
sounds in various aspects of democratic theory concerning
the public’s right to safety, health, and welfare and its power to
use purely private property to effectuate such ends (Smith,
2002).
COMPULSORY LICENSES
Analogous to § 1498, are compulsory patent licenses, the
requirement a private patent holder license the claimed
technology to another private entity. While compulsory
licenses are essentially unheard of in American law, they are
well defined by international treaty, such as the 1994 TRIPS
Agreement. Compulsory patent licenses have recently been used
in Brazil, Ecuador, India, South Africa, and Thailand, among
other countries (Thomas, 2014; Resolución No, 2021. LO-001-
2021). These licenses have been principally granted to generic
drug manufacturers for the purpose of lowering drug costs. In
addition, the compulsory license regime contemplated by the
TRIPS Agreement has been the subject of some current
controversy with respect to patents covering COVID-19
vaccines. The governments of India and South Africa, in
particular, have argued that the Agreement’s compulsory
licensing processes are too lengthy and burdensome to engage
in during the COVID-19 pandemic; they have asked the
Agreement’s oversight body, the World Trade Organization, to
waive these (and other) procedures (2 October Waiver Request,
2020). Other countries have followed suit (25 May Waiver
Request, 2021).
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Compulsory licenses, in this way, present many of the same
governance choices as does § 1498, i.e., a public restriction on
private ownership of patented technology. While they have
largely been used in the public health context—to lower drug
costs, for example—compulsory licenses occupy a broader
institutional power. They can be used, under article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement, for cases of “national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency”—a readily pliable standard.
Compulsory licenses are, therefore political choices concerning
the distribution of private property in cases of extremis—when
too few own too much of a beneficial good, and the government’s
rights in expanding access. And, like other political choices, they
are a resolution a societal tensions between the government’s role
in respecting private property and democratic process concerning
its distribution. One analysis of compulsory patent licenses in
Canada—and their diminishment following the North American
Free Trade Agreement—characterized this tension in compulsory
licenses as just that: between “subjecting domestic law to
corporate-led agreements. . .[and] democratic process in
Canada” (Mohamed and Chaufan, 2020).
LICENSING RESTRICTIONS
Whereas compulsory licenses allow the government to compel
patent license to others—that is, without the permission of the
patent-holder—the government also has the power to restrict
patent licenses if the underlying license agreements violate public
policy. There are a variety of circumstances under which such
restrictions arise, although they mainly center on various aspects
of promoting market competition. One particularly prevalent
example concerns “reverse payment agreements,” the practice of
patent-holders paying others to take licenses to their
technologies, often because the underlying patents are of
questionable validity or it is a cost-effective way at keeping
others out of the market for a given period of time (FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 2013). There are also restrictions on licensing
patents beyond their expiration date (Kimble, 2015 v. Marvel
Entertainment, LLC, 2015); licensing patents to cover technology
beyond that protected by the patent (Princo Corp. v. ITC, 2010);
and licensing patents in a collusive manner (Illinois Tool Works,
Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 2006). In the United States,
resolving these tensions are difficult, but active policing of
licensing restrictions are minimal relative to the quantity of
licensing and litigation otherwise present. In Europe, by
contrast, it is an active area of public litigation despite the
recognition that patent protection is in many ways, itself,
anticompetitive (Petit, 2017).
Restrictions on patent licensing govern circumstances under
which private agreements regarding access to technology. Unlike
some of the other cases described above, these do not immediately
concern the public’s use of the technology or, as with § 1498 or
compulsory licensing, the government picking winners and losers
to use technology. Instead, they center on platting a level (and
broad) playing field for private participation in a given
technology. This is layered on an already substantial literature
exploring the relationship between democratic ideals and the
antitrust laws. Recently, for example, Lina M. Kahn drew a deep
connection between the market power of online platform
services, such as Amazon, and their potential to diminish
democratic values, even in absence of traditional antitrust
concerns like consumer welfare (Kahn, 2017). Patent licensing
restrictions, therefore, can be seen as a governance
choice—sometimes imbued with democratic ideals—regarding
the private development of technologies.
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES
Beyond these public patent licensing governance regimes, there
is a wealth of private ones. Private patent holders largely possess
the right to license their patents to whom they want to on, and
on a variety of financial and practical terms. The largest divide,
perhaps (at least in terms of access and distribution to a given
patented technology) is whether the license is exclusive or
nonexclusive—that is, whether the technology will be
licensed exclusively to a single other entity or broadly
licensed among a variety of market participants. But there
are, to be sure, various gradations in between (Graff and
Sherkow, 2020).
This right to license brings with it a right to establish licensing
conditions governing specific uses or development restrictions
over a particular technology, i.e., barring licensees from engaging
in particular veins of research or development. This occurred
most recently with a suite of genome editing patents owned by the
Broad Institute. The Broad Institute, for its patents covering its
CRISPR technologies, established a tiered regime system for its
licenses concerning whether they were used for academic
research, tool development, or commercial products
(Contreras and Sherkow, 2017). In addition, the Broad
Institute forbid its licensees from engaging in research
pertaining to various controversial applications of CRISPR
genome engineering, including “gene drives,” sterile seed
technology, tobacco enhancement, or human germline
engineering (Guerrini et al., 2017). Contrapositively, others
have pledged not to enforce their patents against others, unless
users were engaged in various forms of unethical behavior. This
was, perhaps, most famously proposed by the scientist Kevin
Esvelt, regarding using CRISPR in an inheritable, “gene drive”
form (Parthasarathy, 2018).
These private license restrictions are themselves a form of
private governance, here, a profit-seeking company’s autonomy
to determine how a technology gets developed and on what terms.
In some instances, they are commendable and dovetail with
governance values centered around attention and expertise.
Oftentimes, private licensors are experts in the technology’s
field and know most about a given technology’s societal
dangers and technical pitfalls (Guerrini et al., 2017). But such
private license regimes can, in many ways, be antidemocratic.
They do not, in any appreciable sense, allow the public input in
what uses will and will not be restricted. These challenges notions
of transparency and legitimacy in technology development. In the
words of Shobita Parthasarathy, private patent license regimes
“seem ill-equipped to address complex societal and value-based
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concerns in an increasingly privatized world” (Parthasarathy,
2018).
CRISPR PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGY
GOVERNANCE
The CRISPR Patent Estate
Since CRISPR genome-editing technology was first described in
2012 (Jinek et al., 2012; Gasiunas et al., 2012), governments
around the world have issued patents covering various forms
of CRISPR-based technology. Arguably, the most famous of these
are patents held separately by the Broad Institute and the
University of California covering one particular iteration of
CRISPR genome-editing, the use of the Cas9 enzyme to cleave
a target DNAmolecule and a single-guide RNA (sgRNA) to direct
Cas9 to its specific, desired location (Contreras and Sherkow,
2017). Those patents have been the subject of a particular
contentious patent dispute between the two institutions. In the
United States, that dispute continues to rage on, and indeed has
grown substantially larger since its inception in 2016. In Europe,
the University of California has largely won, with the European
Patent Office ruling against the Broad Institute (Zyontz and
Pomeroy-Carter, 2021). But there remain persistent disputes
pertaining to inventorship over this foundational iteration of
the technology.
Beyond these patents, the number of CRISPR patents and
patent applications has exploded since the technology’s
invention. A seminal 2016 paper by Egelie et al. catalogued
the patent landscape for CRISPR technologies through 2014,
finding hundreds of patent applications distributed across the
globe. Since then, others have landscaped CRISPR patents in
China, India, and South Africa, among other countries, and
reached similar conclusions (Bire et al., 2021; Chowdhury and
Gargate, 2021; Naidoo, 2020).
Meanwhile, the CRISPR technology itself has significantly
evolved, beyond the Cas9 enzyme and basic forms of genome-
editing, to synthetic forms of CRISPR enzymes and powerful,
precise applications to make a variety of manipulations to the
genome (Porto et al., 2020; Marzec et al., 2020). In addition,
CRISPR has been used in ways other than basic genome-editing,
including as a disease diagnostic, as a screening tool, and as a
guard against deficiencies in other forms of CRISPR (Sanjana,
2017; Chertow, 2018; Zhang et al., 2017;, 2018). All of these
variations and uses are likely patent protected in some fashion. A
recent analysis by Martin-Laffon et al. (2019) found that 45% of
CRISPR patents, worldwide were directed to technical
improvements in the field, including the utilization of variants
of Cas9, advances in sgRNAs their design, and “multiplexing,”
makingmultiple edits simultaneously. At the same time, the reach
of CRISPR patents is unevenly distributed by geography, with
inventors from the United States and China being—far
away—the leading applicants of CRISPR patents (Bire at al.,
2021).
There is a strong expectation CRISPR technology will continue
to be improved and continue to be patented. The academic
literature demonstrates that CRISPR technology will continue
evolve; new applications of CRISPR are announced frequently. As
a consequence, there will be more patents covering various forms
of CRISPR, held by many more players, in more than countries
than current patent landscape analyses suggest. Much of this is a
consequence of the technology’s susceptibility to
“democratization,” i.e., its ability to be cheap, powerful,
flexible, and easy to use (LaManna and Barrangou, 2018). At
the same time, various forms of the technology are planned for
large-scale commercial develop, which brings with it an increased
risk of patent infringement lawsuits. These tensions illuminate
how policies concerning CRISPR patents matter both more and
less as governance instruments of the technology. While patents
covering diverse forms of the technology are increasingly being
held by a broader number of researchers and developers, their
significance for commercial development means that they are
increasingly likely to become arbiters of which variations are
likely to be commercially development, who is involved in
making such determinations, and how much such
development costs. These considerations, in turn, intersect
with the technology’s relationship with democratic power,
institutions, and engagement and participation.
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE OF
CRISPR PATENT LICENSES
Democratic Power and Public Interest
What is democratic governance? What do we mean when we say
a government or system is democratic? Defining or identifying
key markers of democracy help illuminate its qualities and
evaluate how or why its absence is deleterious to society, to
the public (as opposed to private) interest, or to general welfare.
With respect to the patent licensing as an instrument of
governance, two broader principles of democratic theory are
worth exploring: The first is an understanding of democracy
as an equalizing political power, redistributing power away from
elites and toward a greater majority or group (Dahl, 1998). The
second is a justification of this governance theory by analyzing its
legitimacy (Buchanan, 2002). That is, is there intrinsic value in
equitable distribution of political power or do democracies confer
certain benefits or impose consequences on the public that makes
democracy instrumentally desirable? When it comes to concepts
such as equality, for example, many have argued that equality is
either ontologically or instrumentally important, or perhaps both
(Saffon and Urbinati, 2013). Patent licensing requires
policymakers to choose—explicitly or not—whether they (and
the polity) prefer outcomes in which benefits are distributed
equally themselves or are concentrated only for some, by their
users. This suggests an important opportunity and potential for
deliberative engagement given that significant priority setting and
value creation emerges in these governance choices.
In the case of CRISPR, one of the primary concerns is that its
powerful effects will be used to benefit some groups
disproportionately and create discriminatory outcomes for
others. Patent licenses have the ability to maintain the high
cost of therapies, to consequently affect the availability of
insurance coverage, and to stymie competition. In addition,
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patent licenses often shape which diseases are studied for
commercial development (and, therefore, which therapies are
available to the public). That is, “it is precisely the novelty and
power of CRISPR—and the potential effects of its patent
landscape on the public health—that counsel us to solve these
problems before it is too late for patients” (Sherkow, 2017). To be
clear, this calculus is not different in kind from patent licenses for
other therapeutic technologies. But CRISPR’s power to treat if not
cure a great many unevenly distributed genetic diseases means
that the distributional choices made by licensing governance is
likely to have an outsized effect on the polity. Governing
institutions should therefore be accountable to them. Choosing
licensing regimes more (or less) responsive to public input is a
choice tied up with varying theories of democratic control
of—and equality of access to—novel technology.
Yet this is not to say that such choices should primarily focus
on equal access as an end in itself. Given the nature of patent
licensing—almost always with at least one private actor
involved—these benefits should be primarily evaluated
instrumentality. Do they get us what the public wants, even if
achieved by private actors? Democracies are not only desirable
descriptively, but legitimate insofar as a broader distribution of
power creates the conditions for bettering public welfare
(Anderson 2009). This may include the public choice to
encourage the commercial development of CRISPR for some
rarer diseases more so than common ones.
This may have implications for private licensing insofar as
greater government reliance on private licensing to regulate
technology means that the government becomes more and
more accountable to private interests, and less so to the
public’s interest. This is, in some ways, concerning with
respect to ethical licensing restrictions as imposed by the
Broad Insitute on its CRISPR patents. Relying too much on
this model risks corrupting democratic institutions regarding
technology distribution by eroding their ability to distribute
resources equitably. In other words, efforts to correct such
reliances after the technology has expanded becomes stymied
as they become increasingly captured by private interests, giving
sway to their desire to earn a profit or thrive above considerations
of the public (Carpenter, 2014; Contreras and Sherkow, 2017).
To be clear, these aims are not always at odds. The
development of COVID-19 vaccinations, for example, marries
aspects of the public interest with government’s efforts to
distribute novel technology, even while global distribution
efforts have faltered and remain vastly unequal (Georgieva
et al., 2021). And there are pathways in which this can
become malicious, such as when government fails to curb the
power of technology monopolies and they come to dictate our
daily functioning (Kahn, 2017). By giving people greater voice,
accountablility, and ability to shape the rules and laws that affect
their lives, the polity is better able to advocate against domination
and for access, whether it is one desirous of CRISPR therapy or
one antagonistic to it (Rahman 2017). With respect to legitimacy,
this means the ways in which licensing rules are justified or
deemed legitimate depends on whether a particular democratic
arrangement of people does well to protect the most vulnerable
among us. Majority rule, often considered the default democratic
decision-making method, has the capacity to suffer tyrannical
tendencies when it comes to just distribution of resources or
rights protections—patent licensing or otherwise (Ober 2008).
Patent licensing regimes purely dominated by a majority gives the
public ineffective recourse when circumstances change.
Democratic Institutions and Mechanisms
Democracies, at their best, equalize political power or, at least,
create more equitable systems of power distribution. These can be
harnessed toward supporting minority groups, bolstering
marginalized populations, and giving agency to those in other
vulnerable conditions. But how should democracies arrange their
institutions to fulfill these ends in practice? The main theory of
democratic institutions borne out of the Enlightenment has been
a representative system of governance, one in which we choose
the people who choose the laws for us. Some of this justification
has been practical: having everyone decide on everything—say,
via plebiscite—can prove time consuming and overly laborious.
The main substantive reasons though are rooted in a deep distrust
of the larger polity to make decisions that foster their own self-
determination (Sztompka, 1998). The fear of the unruly mob or
the whims of the populous has sustained the ways in which
democracies construct institutions around limiting the power of
individuals or lay groups. This includes the United States
Constitution, which has consistently incorporated a system of
sepration of power among the three branches of government,
including checks and balances, as a solution to “factionalism”
(Federalist No. 10, 1788). Filtering the feelings and views of the
public through their representatives has long been seen as an
important way to contain the people’s unchecked “passions”
(Holmes, 1995; Sabl, 2002) while also capturing their
principal aims.
And so, too, with governing technology through patent
licensing. The bulk of patent licensing regimes readily
available are public in nature, with political representatives if
not at the helm, accountable to their constituents. March-in
rights, government use rights, and compulsory licenses are all
effectuated by political actors who—historically at least—wield
such power on behalf of (or at least with an ear toward) their
constituents. Recent threats of government use rights, for
example, were born from the wellspring of constituent
demands (Brennan et al., 2016). And yet, not all constituent
demands—even popular ones—have achieved changes in patent
license objectives. The case of patented AIDS medicines in in the
1980s is notable (Grossman, 2016). So too, perhaps, are patent
waivers—thus far not enacted—for COVID-19 therapies and
vaccines (2 October Waiver Request, 2020; 25 May Waiver
Request, 2021).
Within this context, therefore, it is notable that it is the
legislature—rather than, say, an elitist judiciary—that has
become the principal site of patent licensing policy and
nuance. In the modern age, democratic rule typically means
electoral democracy, with the mark of a “healthy” or “stable”
democracy one in which there are frequent and fair elections of
representatives (Urbinati, 2006). “Mirrored
representation”—where representatives who demographically
mirror their constituents and can directly attest to their lived
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conditions —may even further such governance through patent
licensing’s instrumental aims (Fishkin, 2013). This theory of a
more direct or participatory democracy has particular
implications for CRISPR patent licensing governance insofar
as it traffics on the technology’s use to treat (or “cure”) certain
forms of disability. Under this theory, the best representative to
oversee genome editing patent licenses for a particular condition
are those who suffer from the condition themselves. This allows
these representatives the knowledge (and political cache) to
determine how best to distribute genome editing technologies
that can eliminate or modify certain genetic diseases, how such
therapies get distributed, and who stands to benefit (or not) from
certain forms of access. This removes these decisions from
companies in charge of designing such therapies which, while
knowledgable about the disease, are more likely moved by market
research of demand and principles of profit maximization rather
than balancing specific rights of access and advancing societal
welfare.
The relationship between profit-maximizing capitalism and
representative democracy is comple. While we do not pretend to
fully untangle and resolve it here, we do note that patent
governance has the potential to be responsive to such
democratic interests or remove them from the public entirely.
This is analogous, perhaps, to regulatory agencies mandate to
protect the public from private interests’ cost-cutting, a bulwark
protecting safe, reliable, and healthy products for consumption.
Increasing the distance from the sight of decision-making runs
the risk of making representative legislatures less democratically
accountable even as it serves an important function in the system.
DEMOCRATIC ENGAGEMENT AND
PARTICIPATION
What role then do or should the populous have in engaging
directly in democratic institutions? While there is good precedent
in including people through deliberative opportunities in one-off
events, what would democratic engagement in patent license
governance look like if it were institutionalized? Does this
governance construct even make sense given that most people
may not even knowwhat patents are, howCRISPRworks, or what
impacts this intersection may have on their lives?
There are roughly two ways of thinking about public
engagement through deliberation: One is through creating or
carving out systems of inclusion, such as town halls or
participatory budgeting. The other is through allowing groups
to participate by creating collective power that acts on institutions
from the outside, such as patient advocacy groups that organize to
pressure rightsholders to understand their views and push for
resources (or object to such work). Beyond these formal
collectives, there is renewed interest in creating randomly
selected bodies of lay people, like a citizens jury, to assess
public perceptions of new technologies (Burgess 2012). If
given the right institutional space, resources, and
tools—especially in a diverse and well moderated group—these
“Citizen Assemblies” have yielded promising results in fostering
people’s ability to understand and analyze complex problems of
technical governance, to interact thoughtfully with one another,
and arrive at rights-protecting collective judgments (Farrell,
Harris, & Suiter 2019). Recently, they have been used in such
places as Scotland, Ireland, France, and Belgium to understand
what the people truly want and to experiment with a modified
form of direct engagement (Carolan, 2015; McKerrell, 2019,
Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2014; Fabre et al., 2021). Most
recently and relevantly as well, a citizen jury was convened in
Austrailia to weigh in human genome editing (“Australia Citizens
Jury on Genome Editing, 2021). Conveners of the Australian
Citizen Jury aim for a more global event convening paritcipants
from around the world to deliberate together (Dryzek et al.,
2020).
For genome editing technologies like CRISPR, deliberative
forums are likely to include a variety of disability rights groups
and environmental protection organizations who are certain to
have, for some use cases, diverging views. A number of groups, for
example, have advocated for patent holders to turn their attention
to particular, oft-neglected diseases, including Duchenne
muscular dystrophy (Miller, 2019). Some of this work is
encouraged, if not mediated, by major CRISPR patent holders,
including the University of California’s Innovative Genomics
Insttute, 2021. Oppositely, an organized group of citizens in
Key West, Florida repeatedly protested against the use of
genomically edited mosquitos from being released into the
environment, with some early success in halting field trials
(Joseph, 2016). As with patented AIDS mediciations, this kind
of power—at least in the United States—is a hallmark of
democratic governance of technology. Akin to voting, these
protections to petition one’s government creates conditions for
lay people to organize with the goals of either endorsing or
protesting technical developments of consequential import.
At the same time, few of these groups or their allies have
considered ways in which patent licensing could effectuate their
goals, either through representative government or directly, to
patent holders. One notable exception is MIT professor Kevin
Esvelt’s proposal to use patent licensing (and the threat of
infringement) to police CRISPR “gene drive” technology—a
strategy that has been noted by some advocacy groups
(Guerrini et al., 2017). In this way, participatory democracy
has an outlet to almost all of the patent licensing regimes
above—both those where representative government is the
medium through which licensing governance occurs, but also
instances of “ethical licensing” by private entities. Further, such
licensing governance operates at a scale appropriate and
achievable for such groups—retail, condition-by-condition or
gene-by-gene advocacy—rather than a wholesale restructuring
of the country’s technology ecosystem more appropriate for
expansive government intervention.
Given these conditions, political theorists interested in using
patent licensing as a form of democratic technology governance
should consider ways to reduce the democratic deficit of these
spaces of power and decision-making authority. And in
conjunction, those interested in patent governance should
consider ways in which deliberative forums like mini-publics
are being included in governance decisions around the world
(Dryzek et al., 2020). Including the voice of the people in patent
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licensing decisions, both from represented stakeholder groups
like the disability rights advocate organizations and in the form of
random selection like Citizens Assemblies, can be of incredible
importance for the public, affecting upstreammoments of private
and capital interests as well downstream impacts on the
distribution of scarce resources and people’s lives. Forgoing
such choices leaves participatory democracy to belatedly
organize after significant decision making has already occurred.
These kinds of deliberative forums, also known as mini-publics,
have varied in kinds, sizes, and selection mechanism and could be
convened by institutions responsible for patent licensing decisions,
including private entities or, in the case of public licensing,
Congress. Similarly, the question of patent governance could
included on the agenda of broader deliberative events about
technology governance, such as the Australian Citizens Jury.
While most mini-publics currently play an advisory role, it is
conceivable that, as they gain traction, their instrumental value in
risk-governance and modes of engagement becomes more
politically acceptable. If licensors grant them increasing levels of
authority, they stand to actually impact the law.
Whereas many people consider the lay public less capable of
reaching certain decisions on such technical issues, evidence from
such mini-publics as Deliberative Polls and other assemblies
shows that mini-publics actually have good capacity for
learning and understanding technical material, and weighing
risk in ways that are helpful value-based perspectives (Fishkin
2019). Given that groups of experts and elites themselves suffer
from certain problems of exclusion, such as silo effects and
skewed risk assessments, combining experts’ work with those
from deliberative forums creates the opportunity for greater
diversity having in risk assessment and weighing private v.
public interests (Scheinerman 2019).
CONCLUSION
Once the province of the arcane, patents should become a larger part of
the conversation concerning technology governance, like that
surrounding genome editing, for they are a powerful form of
technology governance. Licenses, that is, permissions to use patented
technologies, determinewho, what extent, and underwhat terms others
than can use them. These include a variety of government set licensing
regimes that do just that, including licensing regimes sought by the
government itself, march-in rights, government-use rights for others’
patented technologies, compulsory licenses, and restrictions on licenses,
to say nothing of private governance regimes with ethical limitations.
These licenses are themselves a form of democratic oversight that gives
the public the capacity to preventing purely private interests from
superseding their own, especially in ways that are dominating,
oppressing, or otherwise harmful or unjust.
These patent licensing regimes also often intersect and have
different democratic purchase. Some, like march-in rights, are
effectuated only through the filter of representative democracy,
and even then are rarely, if ever, acted upon. Others are subject to
non or even antidemocratic norms in a variety of exclusionary
ways. At the same time, participatory democracy has the potential
to shape patent licensing regimes according to popular will (or
whim), an effort to control the development and distribution of
technology in ways small enough to be effective, both at the level
of government, down to individual patent holders.
This a critically important mechanism for a technology
like CRISPR, one with such heated public interest and with
such intense calls for public accountability. The technology’s
applications have grown tremendously alongside increased
calls for public engagement. There are serious concerns
that certain forms of technology, as released to the wider
public, will be permanent facets of society foisted on it
without its deliberative input. Meanwhile, the CRISPR
patent estates, although once held in the hands of few, are
rapidly expanding.
Facilitating and incorporating public input for such an
expansive technology will likely be a long and difficult
task. It is further unclear what, exactly, the public wants
for such a wide-ranging technology that has so captured
its imagination. Previous efforts, like public commissions,
community representatives on government panels, may
not be successful to garner a definitive view. Smaller,
piecemeal efforts at public engagement over licensing
regimes, both public and private, may contribute to better
digestible—and more effective—forms of democratic
technology governance both because they can be asked a
more targeted policy question and because they are
situated upstream of further distribution policy questions.
Using the patents allows the public to better control
technology under currently established legal regimes
and do so in a way the public deems equitable. The public
is better armed to mitigate the domination of private
interests.
Whether this is viable remains to be seen. Scholars should
look to see whether patent licensing regimes are, in fact, being
used by government to control genome editing technology
and whether the public, through the procedures of
deliberative or participatory democracy or otherwise, is
interested in using patent restrictions as a governance
mechanism. Scholars may also further examine licensing
restrictions to see what the terms are and how they are
generated.
The power of CRISPR, as a technology, ultimately has
strongly democratic features insofar as it is the most
equitably distributed gene editing tool. It can be used by
almost anyone, anywhere in the world, with minimal
training and inexpensive reagents. Yet, the technology’s
commercial development—and some of its most egregious
applications, real and, to date, fictional—have sailed over
many democractic controls otherwise taken for granted.
Democracy, like CRISPR, can be a powerful corrective
technology for the ills of society.
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